Steve: I certainly believe that there is a long way to go before the US establishes what its identity is…

Here is my take on it:

This lack of identity/culture issue has been a perennial criticism of America by outsiders. America has a well established identity, just not in a European sense (perhaps this is an example of culturally determined perceptions). As Harold Bloom and many others have described in numerous essays and books, to be an American, all that is required is the belief in the ideals enshrined in its constitution and Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.” The oaths of enlistment and commissioning into the US armed forces reflect this. Members swear to defend and bear allegiance to the constitution, not the paper it’s written on by the ideals it presents (as opposed to an individual, position, or anything else).

This simplicity in identity means that its features and expression are always dynamic, perpetually morphing according to the challenges of the time and the composition of its population. Even now the assimilation of certain Latino cultural elements can be seen as the Latino population within the US grows. More Latino politicians are being elected into office and non-Latino politicians are altering their positions to become more appealing to a quickly growing voting base. Tom, in an earlier post described it as schizophrenia which seems a very apt to me.

This is not to say that other cultures are static, but the US was established with this flexibility in identity. It was and is a requirement to accommodate the diversity of its population which has continued to grow in size and diversity.

Pip: as Chomsky himself says, “the U.S. electoral system is designed to eliminate genuine political alternatives, impending any meaningful democracy.”

Sean: Not sure how this claim is justified. The American system doesn’t eliminate genuine political alternatives. If anything the US system enables incorporation of political alternatives as they become popular. This has become increasingly true with the rise of the internet. Elected officials, especially at the national level, tend to be extremely centrist adjusting to the popular perspectives of the day. If anything the real problem is that this adjustment is often too slow as it relies on ideas taking hold within a relatively large and diverse population. There are, as with any democracy, considerable problems with the US system, just not as fundamental as Chomsky argues.

Places like Venezuela, now there is where any genuine political alternative is eliminated. Note the recent closing of an opposition minded TV station there. I get the sense that Chomsky is writing with the marginalization of his own brand of alternative in mind (which likely has more to do with its extremeness than any of the flaws within US democracy). As with most Chomsky I’ve read (quite a bit actually) he starts out from an understandable position, or legitimate criticism and ends up off in the deep end, or in the words of David Brooks, a NY Times editorialist, “on planet Chomsky”. For instance, in Failed States, the source of most of the quotes being tossed out in this discussion, Chomsky, I assume for impact, equates the US to the world’s “worst monsters - Hitler, Stalin, Japanese fascists, Suharto, Saddam Hussein and many others.” Is the US really the same as Hitler?

The US certainly bears responsibility for some terrible things, but it arguably has many redeeming values. None of these, however, are ever addressed in Chomsky’s work. He is perpetually committed to pure anti-Americanism over reasonable discourse. This is most unfortunate because, despite making compelling and revealing points initially, he offers very little in the way of practical prescription for what is to be done now. This, in my mind, makes him of little use to academics and policy makers alike. There are many other critical voices out there who, making better use of reason and evidence, lead us to truly useful conclusions.

Realism - Alive or Dead?

All,

I’ve personally enjoyed our discussion on realism and its relevance to the world we currently find ourselves in. After reading through all the posts I wanted to organize some of the thoughts I took away. To do so I’d like to analyze whether some of the “Key Concepts of Realism”, found on page 158 of Baylis and Smith, effectively explain IR.

1. Anarchic international system: I still think this is essentially true but with some qualifications. A supra-national authority that is able to enforce accepted international norms of behavior across the board still does not exist. However, there are organizations that do so for particular regions or for particular aspects of IR. The EU can determine certain policies for its member states and is able to produce consequences for non-conformers. The WTO is an example for economic relations. Perhaps the more these types of organizations order relations for certain issues or areas the more this realist principle becomes less true. One key note here though is that physical security, the primary concern/motivator in realist theory, still is not effectively ordered by any of these regional/issue entities. So for the most important aspect of IR this principle is still true.

2. Self help: this is directly tied to an anarchic system. So for certain issues/regions this concept may be losing significance, but when speaking of physical security this still seems primarily true.

3. Duality of Morality: I think this concept is becoming less salient. Not necessarily because it was never true, but because as international affairs evolve there seems to be growing consequences for immoral actions at the international level. Clearly examples such as camp X-ray and Abu Ghraib show that morality matters at the domestic and international levels.

4. Survival: still the primary concern for international actors. However, certain developments in IR, such as democratic peace and issue/regional organizations mentioned earlier, do make the world less austere, and do ease this concern somewhat.

5. Primacy of the state: still the primary actor but clearly there needs to be some room made for other types of organizations which are able to wield a degree of power internationally. National groupings that exist across state borders, religious based groups, some terrorist groups, multi-national corporations and I’m sure many others are able to impact IR. Therefore realism needs to adjust to include these in order to keep its explanatory power. To be fair though several neo-realist theorists are far less state-centric in their thinking.

Overall I think realism retains a great deal of its ability to explain international interactions. This unit has been a pleasure and I am very much looking forward to future discussions in this new group.

Best,

Sean

Personal Update/quick introduction


Hello to all. For those of you who haven’t been able to shake me since the beginning of WiMW (Pip and Samantha) only a couple things have changed. My family and I are still very much enjoying life in Hawaii. We just returned from a trip to the north of England which has re-invigorated my appreciation of more equatorial climates. The US Air Force still employs me as an intelligence officer but I’ve changed positions within the last few months. Previously I commanded armed Predator UAV missions over Iraq and Afghanistan, a job that was usually rewarding, occasionally exciting, and sometimes frustrating. Now I work for another intelligence agency doing work more focused on the Pacific region. I’m very interested in meeting (virtually at least) everyone and delving into this module.

Came across this article in the NY Times a few weeks back regarding the different world views of James Baker and Condi Rice and their impact on foreign policy. Here is an excerpt:

“They start from completely different places," said Dennis Ross, the Middle East negotiator who worked for Baker years ago and left the State Department early in the Bush administration. "Baker approaches everything with a negotiator's mind-set. That doesn't mean every negotiation leads to a deal, but you engage your adversaries and use your leverage to change their behavior. This administration has never had a negotiator's mind-set. It divides the world into friends and foes, and the foes are incorrigible and not redeemable. There has been more of an instinct toward regime change than to changing regime behavior."

If you refuse to make a full effort to engage your adversary don't you risk locking yourself into conflict? Not only this, but if it should progress to a military conflict, you would not be able to say that all other possibilities were exhausted before sending troops into harm’s way.

A real tragedy could develop in relations with Iran if a non-pragmatic, non-negotiator’s mindset persists. It is a country that teeters between the extremism of the Mullahs and the moderation of the liberals and newly emerging moderate conservatives. Continuing to apply a stonewall approach to relations with Iran would risk pushing these moderates further to the extreme. In a country where the youth are numerous, strong and largely liberal it would seem that time is on the west’s side. Even many conservatives are beginning to split from the hardliners like President Ahmadinejad as witnessed in Iran 's recent elections. In most cases and particularly this one there would seem a definite advantage in using a negotiator’s approach.

(couldn’t access the NY times link without paying so I linked the IHT version of the article instead)

Hope your holidays have been memorable.

sean

During our discussion on the Balkans Bill Caughlin pointed out the criminal nature of the conflict, both in strategy and execution.

To re-quote John Mueller from Bill‘s post:
“the violence that erupted there in the early 1990s derived not from a paroxysm of civilizational angst nor from a frenzy of nationalism, whether ancient or newly inspired. Rather, it principally came from the actions of recently empowered and unpoliced thugs. Politicians may have started the wars… [But they] found it necessary to recruit fanatics, criminals, and hooligans for the job’. [John Mueller, The Remnants of War (2004), p. 88].

Bill further noted that Mueller described the perpetrators as “predatory thugs and criminals … who were chiefly motivated by a quest for fun and profit.”

The same day I read the following from the current Economist regarding Iraq:
“reports suggest that the ’army’ has splintered into groups as small as a few dozen individuals who frequently behave more like street gangs than religious zealots: kidnapping for profit, taking over petrol stations, murdering anyone who transgresses their puritan moral code, and generally using the movements reputation for pious militancy to give themselves legitimacy.”(32)

The above is a description of Sadr’s Mahdi army. This criminal aspect to the current conflict in Iraq is by no means limited to the Mahdi army though. It is evident in other Shia militias like the Badr Brigades, the Sunni insurgency/militias and al Qaeda. Zarqawi himself was a notorious thug long before religion provided a theme for his violence.

Perhaps criminality is a standard aspect of modern conflict. That is not to suggest that it is new. Historical examples of criminality in warfare abound. However, it seems now to have re-emerged as a fundamental part of many post Cold War conflicts, perhaps as a result of the apparent de-institutionalization of warfare.

The next logical questions then are: what does this change and what is the most effective way to deal with it? Should militaries become a mix of warrior and police? I’m not sure., any thoughts?

Sean

Exercise, Exercise, Exercise

During this last unit the Air Force faux deployed a few of us from Hickam Air Force Base to Ramstein Air Base in Germany. We were there for a few weeks to participate in a combined NATO exercise. The exercise, called Austere Challenge, also served as an inspection of the USAFE Air Ops Center (AOC). For me it was also a test of how well WiMW adapted to the military life. This particularly useful as a dry run for me as I am next in line to deploy (for real) to Afghanistan or Iraq. Here are a few observations from the trip:

Connectivity-
At the “deployed” location I had no unclassified network access. This meant online time was limited to that available at our billeting location. There were a few PC’s but they were shared between us and our German guards. If I had been further down range it could have been better or worse. Some of my potential locations have constant access to unclass PC’s and some are further out with very limited access.
In transit access was excellent. My wife, Jessica, was kind enough to surprise me with a new WiFi enabled laptop. Every airport I flew through (Honolulu, San Francisco, Baltimore, Chicago-Ohare, Frankfurt and Charles DeGaul) had a pay wireless network operating. It can be pricey but it can be worth it in the end, especially if you have a fairly active discussion like this last one.

Access to material-
One limfac observed was that I could take with me only what was reasonable to pack or accessible online. This meant that, as useful as it was, Baylis and Smith was out. You may have noticed my points seemed to be slightly Clark-centric. This was not only due to the attractiveness of his arguments but also to the portability of his book. Looking back I should have made Xerox copies of important portions of the larger books and brought a folder of those.

Time-
By far the largest limfac was the amount of time available. This, I think, mirrored reality to most of the intel jobs in CENTCOM. We worked an average of 16 hours a day, 7 days a week. Unless you are super-human like Pip or Nick seem to be then it reduces your effectiveness as a researcher or discussant.

The exercise had a rough start but ended well. Some of you may have a different opinion, but over all I think it was a successful exercise for WiMW as well. We’ll see what the connectivity, access to material and time factors look like when Iraq or Afghanistan comes down the pipe.