Early Soviet Nuclear Strategy

In reading our texts on the development of nuclear strategy one thing has struck me as quite odd, at least up to the 1960's. There seems to be an apparent lack of a comprehensive Soviet nuclear strategy. The historical descriptions indicate that the USSR didn't put much thought toward incorporating the single most destructive weapon into their military strategy. In the west there is a clear tracing of the evolution of nuclear strategy from its roots in strategic bombardment through, massive retaliation, limited war, MAD, ... (Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy) All of these were complex (some more than others) ideas on how best to utilize nuclear weapons during the cold war. On the Soviet side you have seemingly haphazard bluffs and postures. I'll throw out a few thoughts as to why this might be. Let me know if I am missing something or if you have something to add.

1. The USSR believed their rhetoric that claimed nuclear weapons did not matter or alter much. Maybe the Soviets focused so much on their conventional superiority that nuclear strategy was neglected.

2. The US lead in nuclear technology meant that they held the initiative and the USSR could do little more than react to US led developments in weapons and strategy. I am not sure that I give a great deal of weight to this thought.

3. Perhaps the USSR did in fact have a comprehensive strategy but it has not been addressed much in western literature due, initially, to secrecy during the cold war and now to a language barrier. By Gaddis' own admission he only used what he could read, so in actuality all "we now know" is what has been translated to English.

I suspect that the gap where a full Soviet nuclear strategy should be is due to a mix of the above. Again, I could be missing something in which case I would welcome your comments.