All,
My long essay is posted below. Pip engaged the same topic so I am interested to see what his thoughts were. I'll be headed over to his blog shortly.
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The reverberations of Stalin's death struck hard within the Soviet Union and significantly altered several dynamics of the Cold War. As potential replacements within the Kremlin began to openly vie for power, the icy grip of Stalinism was shaken off Soviet society. Out of the political struggle sprang new ideas and approaches not just to foreign policy but to domestic affairs and military thought as well. The consequences were far-reaching, altering the course of international policy and specifically the strategy for fighting the Cold War. Stalin's death also loosened Moscow's power over its satellite states and other socialist states, decentralizing power and policy control. As the iron hand of the Soviet Union waned, Beijing emerged as a new center of socialist power. Stalin's death shifted the dynamics of the Cold War by allowing an emergence of freedom not only within the USSR but within allied countries as well.


New Ideas

The power struggle that occurred within the Kremlin directly after Stalin's death obliterated many of his policies, especially regarding international affairs. Despite their conflicting agendas, it became clear that the new guard favored a more diplomatic approach in foreign relations. Stalinist absolutism was replaced by a policy of stabilization of the Cold War system in Europe and "the emergence of competition (rather than direct military confrontation) as the key form of waging the cold war."(Best, 231)

To his potential successors Stalin's foreign policy legacy was one of mis-step and lost opportunity. As Khrushchev stated at the CPSU Plenum meeting of 28 June 1957:

"With our short-sighted policies we drove Turkey and Iran into the embraces of the USA and England, into the Baghdad Pact. Take the war with Finland. It was costly to us, and as a result of it we were disentangling ourselves for a long time. And the war in Korea, which exacerbated the international situation to the utmost. There was a period in which, as a result of a series of incorrect foreign-policy steps, our relations with the people's democratic countries started to worsen."

Competitors for control of the USSR distanced themselves from Stalin's foreign policy. They sought "a more conciliatory approach to the outside world"(Gaddis, 129) and the phrase "New Course" was quickly entrenched in Kremlin discourse. Malenkov, initially the most likely successor, insisted that there was "no issue that could not be decided using peaceful means."(Best, 228) His rival, Khrushchev, spoke often of the "need to maintain peace."(Khrushchev, UN) The structure of a new, more liberal, foreign policy was taking shape.
With this fundamental shift in Soviet philosophy a corresponding shift in Cold War strategy emerged. While Stalin had inculcated his society with the inevitability of eventual war with capitalist states, Khrushchev believed in a vision of competitive coexistence. As Khrushchev stated in his 1960 speech before the UN, "we do not want to impose our system on other peoples by force … the choice of a particular way of life is the domestic concern of every people."
With the emergence of softer foreign policy tools and a sharp shift away from direct military action, persuasion replaced force as the ideal method to victory. Instead of tanks, the USSR used "psychology, taking initiatives designed to put the west on the defensive."(CIA, 14) As the CIA stated in their report on the 20th CPSU Congress, where Khrushchev presented his secret speech denouncing Stalin, "revolutionary techniques are being changed."(CIA, 3) The new policies were designed to "make the anticipated eventual victory of Communism more easily acceptable and to eliminate at least the more dangerous tensions which have troubled the world throughout the cold war."(CIA, 3) The USSR's new focus was on avoiding war and letting capitalism die peacefully. The US mirrored this change during Eisenhower's term when US policy shifted from a physical to persuasive strategy.(Best, 229)

The Kremlin also considered easing the "rigidly Stalinist system" within Soviet satellite states necessary.(Kramer, 38) In Hungary, which would soon become increasingly complicated for the USSR, Malenkov and his colleagues expressed deep concern for the leadership's domineering style.(Kramer, 35) The USSR now encouraged a slow and controlled liberalization.(Crockatt, 118) Soviet leaders also called for reform in states like Albania where "a reversal of orthodox Stalinism was urgently needed."(Kramer, 38)

The effects of these new foreign policy approaches begin in Europe. Under Stalin the uncertain status of post-war Austria fell to the wayside. The "thaw after Stalin's death" allowed the USSR to re-initiate discussions and offer concessions on the Austrian issue which led to its returned sovereignty.(Gehler, 134) Soviet troops were withdrawn from Port Arthur in Manchuria and Porkkala in Finland. In Yugoslavia, Tito had been isolated under Stalin for straying from Moscow. Under Khrushchev "liquidation of the abnormal relationship with Yugoslavia was done in the interest of … Socialism … [and] peace in the whole world."(Khrushchev, 20th Congress)
Post-Stalin Soviet relations with Finland, a nation interpreted as West-leaning by Soviet leadership, provides a concise and illustrative example of the new policies in action. With Stalin, Finland's continued security was questionable at best.(Rentola, 76) By 1954 the Soviet stance toward Finland had readjusted from ambiguously threatening to more diplomatic and engaging. It was believed that "the clever way to increase Soviet influence in Finland was through political, economic and cultural cooperation."(Rentola, 78) GRU officers, instead of sending scouts to probe Finnish military locations, would invite "Finnish generals for a cocktail and asked their opinions directly."(Rentola, 79) By the summer of 1955 Finland was enjoying its most relaxed atmosphere since the start of the Cold War.

Though the initial focus was on Europe, the US was the primary target of the New Course and Soviet attention quickly reverted to its main opponent. In late summer of 1955 the USSR, US, UK and France came together to discuss issues such as German policy, a non-aggression treaty and restrictions on nuclear weapons.(Best, 228) Though it was a practical failure, the Geneva Summit's significance "lay in the talking itself."(Crockatt, 128)

The idea of Soviet-US rapprochement became a key part of Khrushchev's policy and was manifest in Khruschev's visit to the US and Vice President Nixon's stay in Moscow. By 1959 the US and USSR were coming close to reaching a period of détente (which was sidetracked by the subsequent U-2 incident).(Calvocoressi, 28)

Yet another facet of the new Soviet foreign policy was increased engagement of the Third World. While Stalin was notoriously insulated within Soviet borders, Khrushchev used frequent missions across the globe as a tool of foreign policy. His trips included such Third World destinations as India, Burma and Afghanistan, places generally ignored during Stalin's years.(Calvocoressi, 25) This was part of a larger strategy to enlist the "sympathies of the emerging 3rd world."(Calvocoressi, 27) In turning its attention to the Third World the USSR attempted to reject the 2-Camps paradigm and take on a more flexible view toward the non-aligned camp.(Best, 313) The hope was that a softer Soviet Union would encourage peaceful Third World revolutions.(Crockatt, 125) Ironically, Stalin's death enabled the Soviet Union to extend into a decentralized Cold War fought over a widened international battleground.

With the post-Stalin foreign policy established, the Soviet Union seemed to have gained the initiative on the "core issues of international politics."(Khrushchev, Plenum) As Politburo member Kuznetsov stated at the June 1957 CPSU Plenum meeting:

"How is it possible not to note-even our enemies recognize this-that since 1953, the Soviet Union has enjoyed huge successes in the area of foreign policy, while in 1953, the country was essentially on the brink of war? Friendly ties have been established and are being strengthened with many states on the basis of a struggle to consolidate peace. The int'l authority of the Soviet Union as a leading state in the struggle for peace and security, as the friend of all peoples who are fighting against the imperialists for their national independence and freedom, has grown immeasurably."

New approaches were also applied in the development of nuclear technology and strategy, which had a significant influence on the Cold War. Under Stalin, Soviet strategists were tied down by the Permanently Operating Factors which focused almost exclusively on Soviet ground force strength and marginalized the concept of surprise. Due particularly to this disregard for surprise, innovation in nuclear strategy was not encouraged.(Freedman, 58)
Stalin's death caused an explosion of advances in nuclear research and development. Major General Talensky's September 1953 article "On the Question of the Laws of Military Science" argued that a policy of surprise could establish permanent and possibly decisive effects. (Freedman, 137) Though his ideas were previously considered heretical they were now established as a primary justification for Soviet development of missile technology with particular focus on the ICBM. The restrictive Permanently Operating Factors died with Stalin which "had a liberating effect on Soviet strategic thought."(Freedman, 136) Missile technology would become the keystone to Soviet defense as it enabled Khrushchev to reduce the size of the Soviet military while maintaining security.

The new direction the USSR took in nuclear strategy and the corresponding development in weapons delivery technology revolutionized the course of the Cold War. Imagine for a moment the different path the Cold War would have taken had Sputnik not been developed and American vulnerability not highlighted.

On a broader scale, it seems that the revelation of Stalin's atrocities created a generation of reformers who likely enabled a peaceful end to the Cold War. Speaking at the 20th Congress in 1956, Khrushchev exposed Stalin's "grave abuse of power."(Khrushchev, 20th) He described with detail, in a speech that was intended to remain secret, Stalin's murderous purges, paranoia and destructive domestic policies. As the contents of this speech and associated report circulated, the "cult of the individual" that had held such a tight grip on Soviet society and thought came crashing down.

This moment reshaped the outlook of a generation of leaders that came to be known as the "children of the Twentieth Party Congress."(Smith, 55) Hedrick Smith notes in The New Russians that "it hit them as if they had been struck down by a train, shattering their beliefs to their very foundations, leaving them stunned at first but then, later on, open to new ways of thinking and more flexible than the generation that preceded them, and even those that followed."(Smith, 55) One of the key members of this new generation was the future Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. Khrushchev's unmasking of Stalin "nurtured in him the desire for reform."(Smith, 56) These reformist tendencies would emerge three decades later with perestroika and the end of the Cold War.(Smith, 56)

Without the pervasive fear of heavy-handed Stalinist repression and retribution,some new ideas gained legitimacy and widespread application. The Soviet Union quickly adjusted how it fought the Cold War both diplomatically (New Course) and militarily (ICBM's). Additionally, some of the Children of the 20th Congress would help ensure that the Cold War came to a peaceful end.


Independence and Decentralization

Stalin's death influenced change outside the Soviet Union as well, particularly within fellow socialist states. When Khrushchev made his secret speech denouncing Stalin the Kremlin's reputation and authority over the world socialist movement was discredited. In a report predicting the effects of the 20th Congress, the CIA stated that "the break with Stalin signifies that the leaders of the CPSU will no longer insist that they have a monopoly on the 'correct' way to 'socialism'."(CIA, 10) It went on to predict that it was "likely to create increasing demands from satellites to follow their own path to 'socialism'."(CIA, 10) As it turned out this was essentially true, and nowhere more so than in China.

During Stalin's lifetime, all evidence of an underlying Sino-Soviet split was largely obfuscated by Mao's deference to his more powerful ally. Stalin's overwhelming consolidation of global power made it dangerous for Mao to publicly challenge Soviet control. (Li, 31) Stalin's death and posthumous repudiation signaled a chink in Soviet hegemony and enabled Mao to decisively consolidate his own influence - it soon became apparent that this was the opportunity Beijing had been quietly anticipating.

But it wasn't only Mao's opportunism that deepened the Sino-Soviet split. Elements of the new Soviet foreign policy appeared to betray Soviet-Chinese relations. Mao interpreted Khrushchev's shift to peaceful coexistence with the US as the "appeasement of imperialism."(Crockatt, 123) While Khrushchev considered the US to be less threatening than Stalin had believed, Mao still held that the US was an unapologetic aggressor which remained a serious threat to China. In that regard, Mao "resented and feared Russo-American confabulations."(Calvocoressi, 29) Where there were previously only hints of split a rupture was now clear.

With the Sino-Soviet relationship weakening and the reduction of the Kremlin's position as the sole lead in world socialism, China became more aggressive in exerting its leadership. Though Asia had been China's previous focus, Eastern Europe proved receptive to a socialist alternative to Soviet chauvinism. While Soviet-based socialism had marginalized nationalism it was an integral part of the Chinese version. This was attractive in states such as Hungary where "Chinese influence was reflected in the emerging Hungarian nationalist communists."(Cheng, 494) In September of 1956 the CCP held their 8th congress to which all Eastern European communist parties sent delegations.(Cheng, 496) Thus China was able to consolidate influence by exploiting its image as an alternative that appealed to nationalist roots.

Though China became the most viable contender for power, it was not the only example of a separate path to socialism. In Yugoslavia Tito was also discovering the advantages to life without Stalin. After years of isolation from the USSR, Khrushchev believed that the "'Yugoslavian affair' contained no problems which could not have been solved through party discussions among comrades."(Khrushchev, 20th) The split between Belgrade and Moscow was diplomatically patched up and in doing so Khrushchev legitimized another separate road to socialism.(Hosking, 338)

Others gained greater independence from Moscow as well. Albania and Romania maneuvered for increased freedom by exploiting the Sino-Soviet split.(Crockatt, 121) The uprisings in Poland and Hungary were aimed at removing their Stalinist governments and, while they were handled differently, they both resulted in reduced Kremlin control. In the end, the legacy of Stalin's paranoid and hyper-controlling methods was, paradoxically, a loss of influence for Moscow.

The turmoil that erupted in Eastern Europe after Stalin's death was also in part the consequence of the power struggle between potential successors. This internal competition distracted the Soviet leadership from problems which began to rise in Europe just before Stalin's departure.(Kramer, 9) Political Stability in Eastern Europe was deteriorating. While the domestic situation in Czechoslovakia was near chaos and Hungary was experiencing severe deficiencies, pronouncements and recommendations from Moscow were "erratic and haphazard."(Kramer, 10) This mismanagement combined with the disclosure of Stalin's misdeeds led to unabashed anger against the Kremlin in Eastern Europe.

With Stalin gone the old fears of fierce retribution were loosened, emboldening opponents to act on this latent anger.(Kramer, 16) In Poland the intellectuals revived the clubs and discussion groups, workers began to strike and an uprising soon developed.(Hosking, 338) In East Germany riots erupted in reaction to wage reductions.(Kramer, 42) In Czechoslovakia riots were the product of monetary reform.(Kramer, 19) Encouraged by the Polish example Hungary experienced their own uprising. In Budapest Stalin's statue was smashed and the Hungarian national flag was raised with the hammer and sickle cut out.(Hosking, 340) As dissatisfaction turned to action Soviet control in Eastern Europe became difficult to maintain.

Because Stalin's death enabled new ideas within Moscow to gain legitimacy and allowed greater independence for other socialist states it had a pervasive impact on the Cold War. It resulted in a complete change in Soviet foreign policy. Though there are some exceptions (Hungary for example), the USSR attempted to shift from use of force to the use of persuasion as its primary tool. The results were diverse and numerous, including sovereignty for Austria, removal of Soviet troops from Manchuria and Finland and the normalization of relations with Tito. A new approach was taken toward the US as well. The pessimistic doctrine of inevitable war with capitalist states was scrapped and replaced with competitive coexistence. At the Geneva summit England, France, the US and USSR began serious dialogue on several heavily contentious topics. The Soviets also further internationalized the Cold War by paying increased attention to the 3rd world.

In the realm of strategic thought greater intellectual freedom removed the straight-jacket of Stalin's Permanently Operating Factors. A search for true laws of war and the legitimization of the element of surprise led to greater focus on missile delivery technology. The launch of Sputnik, one of the most influential events of the Cold War, is due in part to this.

Primarily as a result of the revelations of Stalin's abuse of power Soviet influence was reduced and its fellow socialist states gained greater independence. The split with China grew and Mao exploited China's image as an alternative socialist example to garner increased influence, not just in Asia but in Eastern Europe as well. The Soviet normalization of relations with Yugoslavia confirmed the legitimacy of separate paths to socialism. Stalin's outing combined with the Kremlin's mismanagement of Eastern European affairs led to overwhelming dissatisfaction with Moscow and moves toward greater freedom from its control.

In short, Stalin's death produced a softer Soviet foreign policy, greater prominence for nuclear missiles, a reformation movement that would enable a peaceful end to the Cold War and decentralization of the world socialist movement. Its effect on the Cold War was sweeping.



Works Cited

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Smith, Hedrick. The New Russians. New York: Avon, 1990.